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1	  	  
Re	  A	  (Conjoined	  twins:	  surgical	  separation)	  
An	  ethical	  commentary	  
In:	  Ethical	  Judgements:	  Rewriting	  Medical	  Law.	  Stephen	  W	  Smith	  et	  al,	  eds.	  Oxford:	  Hart	  
Publishing,	  in	  press	  
Jackie	  Leach	  Scully,	  Newcastle	  University	  	  
	  
The	   case	   of	   the	   conjoined	   twins	   Jodie	   and	   Mary	   and	   the	   legal	   battle	   that	   led	   to	   their	  
eventual	  separation	  is	  well	  known.1	  From	  the	  outset	  it	  is	  clear	  that,	  as	  both	  Huxtable	  LJ	  and	  
Ost	   LJ	  note,	   there	   is	  no	  obvious	  ethical	   logic	   that	   can	   resolve	   this	  dilemma.	  However,	   it	   is	  
possible	   to	   have	   some	   ethical	   reflections	   on	   several	   central	   concepts	   on	   which	   the	  
judgments	  of	  Huxtable	  LJ	  and	  Ost	  LJ	  are	  based.	  In	  particular,	  I	  wish	  to	  raise	  questions	  about	  
things	   that	   are	  often	   taken	   for	   granted	   in	   cases	   like	   this	   such	   as	   issues	  of	   language;	   ideas	  
about	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  child	  and	  the	  inherent	  complexities	  of	  calibrating	  welfare;	  the	  fresh	  
perspective	   brought	   to	   these	   familiar	   ethical	   dilemmas	   by	   relational	   and	   care	   ethics	  




Both	   judges	   start	   by	  outlining	   the	   facts,	   and	  much	  of	   their	   later	   reasoning	   relies	   on	   these	  
initial	   descriptions.	  Over	   the	   last	   decade	  or	   so	   there	   has	   been	   a	   growth	  of	   interest	   in	   the	  
rhetoric	   of	   medical	   ethics	   and	   bioethics.	   Tod	   Chambers	   showed	   that	   bioethics	   cases	   are	  
narrative	  constructions	  designed	  to	  locate	  the	  reader	  within	  a	  particular	  moral	  or	  legal	  point	  
of	   view,	   even	   if	   not	   direct	   them	   towards	   a	   particular	   conclusion.	  2	  As	   narratives	   they	   are	  
representations	   of	   the	   real	   world,	   both	   contained	   within	   and	   exploiting	   rhetorical	  
conventions	  to	  make	  different	  moral	  evaluations	  more	  or	  less	  compelling.	  In	  the	  judgments	  
of	   Ost	   LJ	   and	   Huxtable	   LJ,	   this	   is	   done	   less	   through	   the	   overall	   narrative	   structure	   than	  
individual	   words	   and	   turns	   of	   phrase.	   Ost	   LJ,	   for	   example,	   describes	   the	   efforts	   of	   the	  
medical	   team	   as	   aiming	   to	   “save	   the	   stronger	   twin”	   [1];	   Mary	   has	   a	   “seriously	   impaired	  
brain,	  heart	  and	   lungs”	  [2]	  and	  faces	  the	  “awful	  prospect”	  of	  being	  “dragged	  around”	  by	  a	  
twin	   who	   is	   developing	   “normally”	   [2].	   	   None	   of	   this	   is	   false,	   but	   it	   takes	   a	   significantly	  
different	  tack	  from	  Huxtable’s	  description,	  in	  which	  Mary	  “relies	  on”	  Jodie’s	  support,	  [1]	  and	  
Jodie	  “owns	  the	  stronger	  organs”	  [2]	  rather	  than	  being	  the	  stronger	  twin.	  These	  differences	  
are	  subtle	  but	  can	  influence	  the	  identification	  and	  evaluation	  of	  salient	  features	  in	  delicately	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  In	  Re	  A	  (Children)	  	  (Conjoined	  Twins:	  Surgical	  Separation)	  [2001]	  Fam	  147.	  2	  T	  Chambers,	  The	  Fiction	  of	  Bioethics	  (New	  York,	  London,	  Routledge	  1999)	  	  
2	  	  
balanced	  dilemmas	  like	  these.	  3	  
	  
	  
The	  welfare	  of	  the	  child	  and	  the	  ethics	  of	  care	  
Working	  within	   the	   framework	  of	   family	   law,	  Huxtable	   bases	   his	   second	   argument	  on	   the	  
primacy	  of	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  child,	  and	  ultimately	  on	  children’s	  entitlement	  to	  have	  the	  law	  
protect	  their	  interests	  and	  lives	  [10-­‐15].	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Jodie	  and	  Mary,	  the	  difficulty	  is	  that	  
there	  are	  two	  children	  involved	  (in	  most	  accounts)	  and	  both	  cannot	  be	  equally	  protected.	  In	  
terms	   of	  medically	   determinable	   parameters,	   Jodie’s	  welfare	   is	   best	   served	   by	   separation	  
because	  she	  can	  survive	  the	  separation	  but	  will	  die	  if	  it	  does	  not	  happen.	  But	  separation	  will	  
inevitably	  mean	  the	  death	  of	  Mary,	  and	  it	  is	  hard	  (though	  not	  impossible)	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  
serves	  her	  welfare.	  Equally,	  though,	  if	  she	  is	  likely	  to	  die	  anyway	  ,	  the	  death	  of	  Mary	  is	  not	  of	  
itself	  a	  decisive	  ethical	  factor	  tipping	  the	  balance	  one	  way	  or	  another.	  	  
	  
In	   medico-­‐legal	   cases	   like	   these	   the	   evaluation	   of	   interests	   tends	   to	   prioritize	   things	   like	  
health	  and	  even	  basic	  survival.	  However	  neither	  Jodie’s	  nor	  Mary’s	   interests	  are	  exhausted	  
by	  the	  predicted	  clinical	  outcomes;	  ([7])	  the	  wider	  concerns	  of	  the	  surviving	  child,	  and	  of	  the	  
family	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  either	  decision,	  need	  also	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	  Ethicists	  have	  
difficulty	   identifying	   these	   interests,	   let	   alone	   grasping	   their	   significance	   to	   the	   different	  
actors	  in	  the	  story	  to	  start	  weighing	  them	  up.	  Since	  there	  is	  genuine	  uncertainty	  about	  what	  
constitutes	  the	  best	  interests	  and	  welfare	  of	  Jodie	  and/or	  Mary,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  the	  doctors	  or	  
lawyers	   but	   the	   parents	   (and	   Jodie	   and	  Mary	   themselves)	   who	  will	   have	   to	   live	   with	   the	  
consequences,	  Huxtable	  concludes	  that	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  parents	  should	  prevail	  [16].	  This	  
argument	   is	   pragmatic	   and	   compassionate	   but	   theoretically	   rather	   thin.	   A	   more	   ethically	  
satisfying	  basis	  may	  be	  found	  in	  a	  relationally	  grounded	  ethics	  of	  care,	  and	  more	  broadly	  an	  
ethics	  in	  which	  the	  moral	  necessities	  special	  to	  familial	  relationships	  are	  taken	  seriously.4	  	  
	  
Ethics	  of	  care	  is	  arguably	  something	  of	  a	  misnomer:	  while	  it	  describes	  an	  approach	  focused	  
on	   the	   moral	   obligations	   generated	   by	   dependent	   human	   animals’	   needs	   for	   care,	  
contemporary	   care	   ethics	   does	   so	   less	   because	   of	   an	   interest	   in	   the	   practice	   of	   care	   than	  
because	   it	  recognizes	  the	  primary	   importance	  of	   (often)	  asymmetric	  relationships	  to	  moral	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Chambers	  (n	  2).	  4	  	  V	  Held,..	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Care:	  Personal,	  Political,	  and	  Global	  (Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006)	  T	  Pettersen,.	  “The	  Ethics	  of	  Care:	  Normative	  Structures	  and	  Empirical	  Implications”	  (2011)	  19	  Health	  Care	  Analysis	  51–64.;	  J	  Tronto,.	  Moral	  Boundaries:	  A	  Political	  Argument	  for	  an	  Ethics	  of	  
Care(London:	  Routledge1993).	  
3	  	  
life.	   The	   terminology	  of	   care	   is	   shorthand	   for	   saying	   that,	   outside	  of	   legal	   contracts,	  most	  
human	   relationships	   are	   asymmetric;	   those	   relationships	   that	   are	   most	   emotionally	   and	  
morally	   important	   to	  us	   tend	  not	   to	  be	   the	   freely	  chosen	  coming	   together	  of	  autonomous	  
equals;	  and	  special	  attention	  must	  be	  given	  to	  relationships	  involving	  care	  precisely	  because	  
the	   giving	   or	   receiving	   of	   care	   exemplifies	   this	   unavoidable	   imbalance	   of	   power	   and	  
dependency	  in	  human	  contacts.	  5	  	  
	  
Jodie	   and	  Mary	   were	   utterly	   dependent	   on	   the	   care	   given	   to	   them	   by	   their	   parents	   and	  
wider	  family,	  as	  much	  as	  the	  medical	  care	  they	  needed.	  So	  the	  analytic	  framework	  provided	  
by	  care	  ethics	  becomes	  highly	  salient.	  Prioritizing	  care	  does	  not	  resolve	  the	  dilemma,	  but	  it	  
foregrounds	  a	  set	  of	  moral	  criteria	   that	  may	  be	  obscured	  by	  other	  ethical	   theories.	   	  While	  
any	   ethical	   analysis	   must	   acknowledge	   the	   twins’	   radical	   dependency	   on	   others,	   a	   care	  
ethics	  perspective	  gives	  more	  prominence	  to	  other,	  less	  obvious	  aspects	  of	  care,	  such	  as	  the	  
moral	   importance	   to	   the	   parents	   of	   providing	   the	   best	   support	   to	   that	   dependency	   –	   the	  
best	  kind	  of	  care	  –	  and	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  what	  that	  means	  from	  the	  parents’	  point	  of	  view.	  For	  
example,	   the	  parents’	   rejection	  of	  surgery	   is	  articulated	   in	   the	   judgments	   in	   terms	  of	   their	  
religious	   scruples.	   These	   scruples	  are	  not	  given	  close	  examination.	  They	  might	   rest	  on	   the	  
teachings	   of	   the	   Roman	   Catholic	   church,	   but	   they	   may	   also	   be	   influenced	   by	   a	   more	  
theologically	  and	  ethically	  complex	  sense	  that	  the	  best	  form	  of	  care	  for	  both	  of	  their	  children	  
is	   through	   equal	   acceptance	   of	   both	   children.	   ‘Care’	   entails	   something	   other	   than	   the	  
preservation	  of	  bare	  life.	  In	  the	  vocabulary	  of	  a	  contemporary	  relational	  ethics	  of	  care,	  it	  is	  
less	  about	  providing	  for	  the	  physical	  and	  medical	  dependencies	  of	  the	  infants	  than	  it	  is	  about	  
caring	  for	  and	  about	  existing	  and	  future	  relationships.	  This	  might	  mean	  taking	  into	  account	  
not	  just	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  parents	  and	  their	  children,	  but	  also	  the	  one	  between	  
Jodie	   and	   Mary:	   a	   relationship	   which	   the	   parents’	   faith	   tells	   them	   will	   continue	   beyond	  
physical	  death.	  	  
	  
A	  care	  ethics	  approach	  can	  include	  other	  actors	  who	  constitute	  the	  fabric	  of	  relationships	  in	  
complex	   medico-­‐legal	   dilemmas,	   but	   whose	   own	   moral	   needs	   and	   vulnerabilities	   are	  
normally	  less	  prominent.	  In	  this	  case,	  we	  might	  want	  to	  look	  at	  the	  clinical	  team	  and	  other	  
hospital	  staff.	   It	   is	   important	  to	  be	  clear	  that	  acknowledging	  that	  medical	  professionals	  are	  
involved	  in	  various	  forms	  of	  care	  relationship	  with	  Jodie	  and	  Mary	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  E.F.	  Kittay	  and	  E.K.	  Feder,	  The	  Subject	  of	  Care:	  Feminist	  Perspectives	  on	  Dependency	  (New	  
York,	  Rowman	  and	  Littlefield,	  2002).	  
4	  	  
moral	  claims	  have	  the	  same	  weight	  as	  those	  of	  the	  children’s	  parents.	  But	  it	  counterbalances	  
the	   way	   that	   in	   many	   accounts	   these	   other	   actors	   appear	   solely	   as	   representatives	   of	   a	  
particular	  clinical	  option	  or	   line	  of	   legal	  reasoning,	  even	  when	  they	  have	  their	  own	  opinion	  
on,	  and	  moral	  investment	  in,	  the	  right	  course	  of	  action	  for	  Jodie	  and	  Mary.	  
	  
Family	  ethics	  
Very	  recently,	   the	  focus	  on	  relationality	  and	  relationships	  of	  care	   in	  both	  health	  and	  social	  
care	  contexts	  has	  led	  to	  a	  developing	  “ethics	  of	  the	  family”.	  This	  approach	  does	  not	  privilege	  
or	   naturalize	   the	  moral	   claims	   of	   families,	   but	   it	   is	   influenced	   by	   the	   recognition	   there	   is	  
“discordance	  between	  the	  sorts	  of	  ethical	  relationships	  and	  perspectives	  that	  exist	  within	  a	  
family,	   and	   those	   that	   govern	   the	   behaviour	   of	   the	   healthcare	   system	   dealing	  with	   those	  
families”.6	  For	   instance	   cases	   like	   Jodie	   and	   Mary’s	   tend	   to	   be	   approached	   as	   a	   conflict	  
between	  the	  medical	  profession	  and	  the	  family	  over	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  patient.	  The	  result	  of	  this	  
antagonistic	   framing	   is	   that	   the	   ethical	   imperatives,	   priorities	   and	   tensions	   of	   patients’	  
families	  tend	  not	  to	  be	  explored	  in	  detail	  until	  problems	  arise,	  especially	  problems	  between	  
the	  families’	  views	  and	  those	  of	  the	  clinical	  team.	  In	  case	  studies	  used	  to	  teach	  the	  ethics	  of	  
end	   of	   life	   decisions,	   the	   patient’s	   relatives	   commonly	   only	   become	   involved	   at	   the	   point	  
where	  they	  question	  their	  loved	  one’s	  decision	  making	  capacity,	  or	  challenge	  a	  clinical	  care	  
decision;	  less	  interest	  has	  been	  shown	  in	  the	  conversations	  about	  care	  these	  actors	  (patients	  
and	  families)	  may	  have	  had	  long	  before	  the	  clinicians	  made	  an	  appearance.	  7	  
	  
Persons	  and	  bodies	  
	  
I	  have	  not	  said	  much	  about	  Ost	  LJ’s	  discussion,	  largely	  because	  its	  core	  is	  about	  the	  doctrine	  
of	  double	  effect	  (DDE),	  and	  as	  she	  notes,	  this	  has	  been	  debated	  by	  moral	  philosophers	  and	  
lawyers	   for	   a	   very	   long	   time	   [4].	   However,	   one	   aspect	   of	   Ost	   LJ’s	   discussion	   points	   in	   a	  
different	   direction,	   and	   although	   it	   is	   not	   followed	  up	   in	   the	   judgment	   it	   is	   central	   to	   the	  
ethics	  of	  this	  and	  other	  cases	  involving	  conjoined	  twins.	  	  This	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  identities	  of	  
Jodie	  and	  Mary.	  There	  remains	  genuine	  uncertainty	  about	  how	  many	  patients/persons	  are	  
present.	  This	  does	  not	   just	  make	   for	  a	   tricky	  moral	  dilemma	  here:	   it	  presses	  against	   some	  
fundamental	   assumptions	   about	   personhood,	   individuality,	   embodiment,	   and	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  MA	  Verkerk,	  et.	  al.	   ‘Where	  Families	  and	  Healthcare	  Meet’	   	   (2015)	  41	   Journal	  of	  Medical	  Ethics	  183-­‐185.	  7	  See	  eg	  C	  Rehmann-­‐Sutter,	  H	  Gudat,	  	  and	  K	  Ohnsorge,	  The	  Patient’s	  Wish	  to	  Die:	  Research,	  Ethics	  
and	  Palliative	  Care	  (Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2015).	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relationships	  between	  those	  concepts.	  
	  
In	   using	   the	   DDE	   in	   a	   comparison	   between	   delivering	   analgesics	   to	   relieve	   a	   patient’s	  
suffering	   (and	   thereby	   shortening	   life),	   and	   the	   separation	   of	   Jodie	   and	   Mary,	   Ost	   LJ	  
mentions	  Ward	  LJ’s	  contention	  that	  the	  DDE	  cannot	  apply	  to	  the	  conjoined	  twins	  as	  (i)	  the	  
surgery	  affects	   two	  distinct	  patients,	  and	  (ii)	   for	  one	  of	   them,	  Mary,	  surgery	   itself	   is	  not	   in	  
her	  best	  interests.8	  Although	  Ost	  LK	  ultimately	  disagrees	  with	  Ward	  LJ	  on	  this	  conclusion,	  she	  
does	  not	  challenge	  the	  claim	  that	  two	  individuals	  are	  present	  [17].	  Similarly	  Huxtable	  LJ	  also	  
agrees	   with	   Ward	   LJ	   that	   although	   Jodie	   and	   Mary	   are	   conjoined,	   they	   are	   not	   one	  
individual:	  “we	  are	  determining	  the	  fates	  of	  two	  children”	  [2].	  The	  consensus	  is	  there	  is	  not	  
one	  person	  but	  two,	  trapped	  in	  an	  anomalously	  singular	  body.	  If	  prenatal	  development	  had	  
run	  as	   it	   should,	  Mary	  and	   Jodie	  would	  have	  been	   two	   individuals	   in	   two	  separate	  bodies.	  
Something	  has	   gone	  wrong,	   and	   surgical	   separation	   can	  put	   it	   right.	   	   In	   line	  with	   this,	   the	  
available	   empirical	   evidence	   suggests	   that	   in	   most	   cases	   where	   both	   conjoineds	   have	  
undergone	   normal	   cognitive	   development,	   there	   are	   two	   subjectivities,	   two	   persons,	  
present.9	  This	   is	   why	   surgical	   separation	   of	   conjoined	   twins	   is	   normally	   undertaken,	   even	  
when	  not	  separating	  them	  does	  not	  present	  an	  acute	  issue	  of	  survival	  because	  two	  persons	  
require	  two	  bodies.	  
	  
Perhaps,	  though,	  we	  do	  not	  have	  a	  case	  of	  two	  subjectivities	  unable	  to	  step	  away	  from	  each	  
other	   because	   they	   are	   stuck	   together	   in	   the	   same	   skin.	   Philosophers,	   especially	   feminist	  
philosophers,	   are	   increasingly	   paying	   attention	   to	   the	   phenomenology	   of	   embodiment	   in	  
shaping	   our	   moral	   perceptions	   and	   judgements.10	  They	   argue	   the	   kind	   of	   body	   through	  
which	   we	   engage	   with	   the	   world	   also	   shapes	   the	   moral	   and	   other	   stances	   that	   we	   hold	  
towards	   that	   world.	   If	   so,	   being/inhabiting	   a	   very	   unusual	   form	   of	   body	   might	   generate	  
preferences	   and	   priorities	   that	   are	   also	   to	   some	   extent	   anomalous	   -­‐	   it	  would	   be	   hard	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  In	  Re	  A	  (Children)	  (Conjoined	  Twins:	  Surgical	  Separation)	  [2001]	  Fam	  147	  (CA)	  199	  (Ward	  LJ).	  9	  A	   Dreger,	  One	  of	  Us:	   Conjoined	  Twins	   and	   the	   Future	   of	  Normal	   (Harvard,	   Harvard	   University	  Press,	  2004).	  10	  SL	  Bartky,	  	  Femininity	  and	  Domination:	  Studies	  in	  the	  Phenomenology	  of	  Oppression,	  (New	  York,	  Routledge,	   1990);	   G	   Weiss,	   ,	   Body	   Images:	   Embodiment	   as	   Intercorporeality,	   (New	   York	   and	  London,	   Routledge,	   1999).	   IM	   Young,	   	   On	   Female	   Body	   Experience:	   “Throwing	   Like	   a	   Girl”	   and	  
Other	  Essays,	   (New	  York,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005).	  See	  also	  YM	  Barilan,	   ‘One	  or	  Two:	  An	  Examination	   of	   the	   Recent	   Case	   of	   the	   Conjoined	   Twins	   from	   Malta’.	   (2003)	   28	   Journal	   of	  
Medicine	  and	  Philosophy	  27-­‐44;	  M	  Shildrick,	   ‘Some	  Speculations	  on	  Matters	  of	  Touch’	  (2001)	  26	  
Journal	  of	  Medicine	  and	  Philosophy	  	  	  387-­‐404.	  
6	  	  
those	  of	  us	  who	   inhabit	  standard	  model	  bodies	   to	  predict	   these	  preferences	  and	  priorities	  
with	  any	  real	  confidence.11	  	  	  
	  
There	  is	  some	  evidence	  for	  this	  in	  cases	  of	  conjoined	  twins.	  Huxtable	  LJ,	  drawing	  on	  Dreger’s	  
work,12	  reports	  only	  one	  example	  where	  adult	  conjoined	  twins	  asked	  to	  be	  separated	  [21].	  
Even	  when	  one	   twin	   has	   died,	  which	  would	   generally	  mean	   the	   death	   of	   the	  other	   -­‐-­‐	   the	  
closest	   analogy	   to	   the	   situation	   of	   Jodie	   and	  Marie	   –	   separation	   has	   not	   been	   requested.	  
Adult	   conjoined	   twins	   rarely	   if	   ever	   see	   themselves	   as	   separable,	   even	   when	   remaining	  
joined	  means	  certain	  death.	  This	   is	  not	  a	  state	   into	  which	  most	  of	  us,	  used	  to	  being	  single	  
persons	  within	  a	  single	  body,	  can	  easily	  imagine.	  	  
	  
Perhaps	  conjoined	  twins	  are	  better	  considered	  as	  a	  novel	  class	  of	  persons	  who	   inhabit	  the	  
world	   in	   a	   different	   way:	   neither	   as	   single	   persons,	   but	   nor	   as	   two	   persons	   joined	   by	   an	  
accident	  of	  nature,	  and	  who	  would	  inevitably	  be	  better	  off	  normalized	  through	  separation.	  	  
The	  conjoined	  body	   like	   this	  has	   some	  parallels	  with	  a	  more	  common	  variation	  where	   the	  
practice	   of	   ‘normalisation’	   has	   attracted	   recent	   bioethical	   attention:	   	   the	   bodies	   of	   those	  
born	  with	  ambiguous	  genitalia	  so	  that	  they	  are	  not	  easily	  identified	  as	  anatomically	  male	  or	  
female.	  	  Until	  recently	  the	  default	  response	  to	  ambiguous	  genitalia	  was	  surgical	  intervention	  
to	  ‘restore’	  the	  baby	  or	  child	  to	  visible	  normality.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  tidying	  up	  the	  external	  
genitalia	   so	   that	   they	   look	   indubitably	  male	  or	   female	   is	  not	  always	   consistent	  with	  either	  
the	  internal	  anatomy,	  or	  the	  later	  self-­‐perception,	  of	  the	  individual	  concerned.	  Conceptually,	  
normalisation	   is	   increasingly	   challenged	   for	   being	   a	   lazy	   retreat	   into	   binary	   gender	  
categories;	   a	   growing	   number	   of	   bioethicists	   are	   arguing	   for	   the	   ontological	   validity	   of	  
intersex	  subjectivities	  that	  are	  neither	  conventionally	  male	  nor	  female.13	  	  
	  
If	  we	  were	  to	  consider	  conjoined	  bodies	  in	  a	  similar	  way,	  what	  might	  be	  the	  consequences	  
for	   the	   ethics	   of	   this	   case?	   First,	   and	   as	   I	   emphasised	   at	   the	   outset,	   it	  wouldn’t	   solve	   the	  
dilemma	  of	  this	  specific	  situation	  –	  in	  fact	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  what	  would.	  But	  it	  does	  open	  up	  a	  
space	   for	   understanding	   conjoineds	   as	   something	   other	   than	   anomalies	   that	   need	   to	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  J	  Leach	  Scully,	  ‘Moral	  Bodies:	  Epistemologies	  of	  Embodiment’	  in	  H	  Lindemann,	  M	  Verkerk	  &	  M	  Urban	   Walker(eds),	   Naturalised	   Bioethics:	   Towards	   Responsible	   Knowing	   Practice	   (Cambridge	  University	   Press,	   2008);	   J	   Leach	   Scully,	   Disability	   Bioethics:	   Moral	   Bodies,	   Moral	   Difference,	  (Lanham,	  MD,	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield,	  2008).	  12	  Dreger	  (n	  7).	  13	  A	  Fausto-­‐Sterling,	  Sexing	  the	  Body:	  Gender	  Politics	  and	  the	  Construction	  of	  Sexuality.	  New	  York:	  Basic	   Books	   (2000);	   EK	   Feder,	   Making	   Sense	   of	   Intersex:	   Changing	   Ethical	   Perspectives	   in	  
Biomedicine	   Indianapolis:	   Indiana	   University	   Press	   (2014);	   L	   Ermer,	   ‘Paradigms	   Revised:	  Intersex	  Children,	  Bioethics	  and	  the	  Law’	  	  (2002)	  11	  Annals	  of	  Health	  Law;	  195-­‐236	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rescued	  and	  restored.	  	  Viewing	  conjoineds	  as	  way	  of	  being	  in	  which	  two	  persons	  are/inhabit	  
a	   single	  body	   is	  different	   in	   important	  ways	   from	  a	   starting	  point	   in	  which	   two	   individuals	  
who	  should	  be	  in	  two	  bodies	  are	  competing	  with	  each	  other	  for	  ownership	  of	  a	  single	  set	  of	  
structures	  and	  organs.	   	  As	  Bratton	  and	  Chetwynd	  note,	   in	  a	  number	  of	  historical	  cases	  the	  
assignment	  of	  internal	  organs	  before	  conjoineds	  are	  separated	  has	  been	  arbitrary	  enough	  to	  
suggest	  a	  psychological	  need	  to	  believe	  that	  one	  twin	  has	  a	  greater	  right	  to,	  say,	  the	  shared	  
heart,	  and	  therefore	  a	  greater	  right	  to	  life,	  to	  justify	  the	  intervention.14	  Perhaps	  instead	  we	  
might	   think	  about	  conjoined	   twins	  as	   two	  persons	   in	  a	  single	  body	  –	  which,	   in	   the	  case	  of	  
Mary	  and	  Jodie,	  is	  an	  impaired	  body	  because	  of	  the	  cardiac	  insufficiency.	  	  Their	  single	  body	  
is	  terminally	  ill,	  but	  still	  offers	  both	  persons	  the	  possibility	  of	  some	  life	  –	  even	  a	  reasonably	  
good	  quality	  of	  life	  -­‐-­‐	  in	  biographies	  that,	  at	  least	  initially,	  seemed	  more	  acceptable	  to	  their	  
parents	  than	  the	  alternative	  provided	  by	  separation.	  
	  
A	  second	  ethical	  consequence	  would	  be	  to	  provide	  an	  even	  more	  compelling	  rationale	  for	  a	  
better	  understanding	  of	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  live	  conjoined.	  Ultimately	  this	  would	  need	  to	  come	  
from	   empirical	   and	   experiential	   work	   with	   surviving	   conjoineds,	   about	   how	   they	   see	   the	  
world	  and	  their	  place	  in	  it	  generally	  but	  also,	  crucially,	  what	  they	  think	  about	  the	  question	  of	  
separation.	  Would	  they	  wish	  to	  be	  separated;	  do	  they	  wish	  they	  had	  been	  separated	  earlier	  
in	  their	  development;	  would	  they	  want	  to	  be	  separated	  if	  the	  option	  is	  death?	  Do	  words	  like	  
‘separate’	   and	   ‘individual’	   and	   ‘autonomy’	   even	  mean	  quite	   the	   same	  as	   they	  do	   for	  non-­‐
conjoineds	  	  -­‐-­‐	  and	  is	  their	  alternative	  meaning	  sustainable,	  interesting,	  and/or	  useful	  for	  the	  
rest	  of	  us?	  Information	  like	  this	  is	  essential	  in	  order	  for	  families	  and	  healthcare	  professionals	  
to	  make	  decisions	  that	  are	  based	  on	  the	  lives	  of	  people	  whose	  experience	  is	  very	  different	  
from	   the	   statistical	   norm.	   In	   the	   end,	   the	   necessity	   of	   gathering	   information	   to	   support	  
ethically	  justifiable	  decisions	  is	  itself	  an	  ethical	  matter;	  it	  is	  not	  ethical	  to	  make	  life-­‐changing	  
medical	   interventions	   based	   on	   inadequate	   information	   when	   at	   least	   some	   of	   that	  
information	  is	  available	  if	  only	  we	  would	  make	  the	  effort.	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